Amidst the borders of the vast Taklamakan Desert
In Sinkiang (alternatively known as Xinjiang Province of China), lies in the north of Siachen Glacier, an unlikely oasis — and nestled within this oasis is a newly built manufacturing facility that is going to alter the dimensions of the geostrategic equations between the US, China, and India.
This factory is soon going to become one of the world’s largest plants to manufacture Polysilicon, a substance that is an intermediate product in the manufacturing process of silicon wafers that are then transformed into an innumerable range of microchips for multiple applications.
The world is powered by microchips that run everything — from pacemakers to mobile phones to geostationary satellites. There is an emerging cold war between the US and China which is rapidly dividing the world between those that have access to advanced microchip technology and those that do not. The US is positioning itself to weaponize the innovation, technology, and intellectual property ecosystem in microchips, just as China leveraged its size and economic assistance for the Belt Road Initiative.
The US is now advocating and telling its friends to stop using Chinese giant Huawei’s telecom products that use microchips made by its subsidiaries.
How it Started – Revealing Chinese Cards
On November 21st, 2016, the US Navy’s US $4.4 Bn guided missile destroyer USS Zumwalt, while traversing the Panama Canal, suffered a catastrophic propulsion failure. Just two days later, on November 23rd, the British Royal Navy’s US $1.2 Bn high-tech destroyer HMS Duncan suffered a similar failure while on NATO manoeuvres.
The reason identified behind this was Chinese Chip Destroyer, a type of microchip manufactured by the Chinese PLA that the US Navy was forced to buy in tens of thousands as a cost-cutting exercise. When forensic technicians were deployed, they found that all of the microchips received from a particular manufacturer had the same flaw — instead of being laser-etched with mil-spec equivalents of an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) resistance, these had civilian wiring equivalent to a 3-amp fuse.
In general, electronic components are connected together like a daisy chain. Even 10 hardened microchips soldered in a series should survive a short burst of electromagnetic energy called EMP — but these did not. If such failure occurs during war or conflict, replacements would not be easily available. All spares warehoused on a ship or ashore would also get roasted by the same invisible pulse or EMP.
There are so many embedded semiconductors wired on a nanoscale that to rectify them, each one would have to be inspected and re-certified at test centres equipped with specialized equipment — an impossibility. In fact, it has been proven that in these two ships, Chinese microchips reportedly also had backdoors installed for easy hacking. Subsequently, Trump in 2018 banned all such Chinese companies like Huawei, ZTE, and others by bringing in the National Defence Authorisation Act.
What it Requires to Make a Microchip
Microchips require two critical raw materials — Sand & Freshwater. A 30 cm silicon wafer requires almost 10,000 litres of fresh water for its manufacture. All of China’s major rivers like the Yangtze, Yellow River, and Mekong are already choked with effluents.
The Taklamakan Desert provides sand in abundance, and there is a huge reserve of water stored in the lakes, rivers, and glaciers of the Himalayan and Karakoram mountain ranges. Leading Chinese polysilicon wafer producer GCL-Poly Energy Holdings is completing a 130,000 MT polysilicon plant outside Kashgar in Sinkiang (Xinjiang) which, when completed, would be the world’s leading low-cost, high-quality polysilicon production base for the modified Siemens method of polysilicon manufacturing.
Is it What Makes China More Thirsty for Waters?
Is this quest for water one of the driving forces behind China’s Belt and Road Initiative (CPEC) in Pakistan? Way back in 1954, China encroached into Indian territory in Aksai Chin, which is an extension of the Taklamakan Desert, and occupied the whole area ostensibly to build a road linking Sinkiang and Tibet, both annexed during the same period.
But even then, farsighted Chinese strategists were interested in the Shaksgam Valley, which is home to 242 glaciers and considered one of the most heavily glaciated regions in the world outside the poles. Aksai Chin provides alternate access to Shaksgam Valley.
The Shaksgam Valley fell into Pakistan’s lap in 1947 as a consequence of British perfidy in orchestrating the Gilgit rebellion during partition. The Chinese and Pakistanis were in secret negotiations in 1962 when China invaded India. Their border deal and the transfer of the Shaksgam Valley to China took place in early 1963.
Before this deal, China had already surveyed plans for a transportation corridor stretching from the Chinese border to Pakistan’s deep-water ports on the Arabian Sea. It was in this connection that Pakistan purchased Gwadar from Oman in 1958. In fact, Oman had first offered it to India, but Nehru turned it down — with no wisdom applied as usual.
After the purchase of Gwadar, the Chinese started construction of the Karakoram Highway in 1959. Warning bells should have been sounded in India, but nobody seemed worried. In fact, India signed the Indus Water Treaty in 1960, giving Pakistan a lion’s share of the waters from the six major rivers of North India. India was allowed to tap 19.48% of the waters of the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab, but has not exploited even that legal share.
Now the question arises — was the Chinese incursion into Aksai Chin in 1954, Pakistan’s purchase of Gwadar port in 1958, the commencement of the Karakoram Highway in 1959, the Indus Water Treaty in 1960, the 1962 war, and the Sino-Pakistan deal on Shaksgam Valley in 1963 — all interconnected milestones in a far-reaching conspiracy to steal India’s waters?
The 1300 km long Karakoram Highway, whose survey work started in 1959, took 20 years to complete. Delays in China were primarily because of the failure of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution in 1960 and 1966–1971 respectively. When it actually began in late 1966, Pakistan initially suggested routing it through the Mintaka Pass, but it was later made through Khunjerab Pass, as the former was more susceptible to air strikes.
The highway starts from Kashgar in Sinkiang and ends at Hasan Abdal in Punjab, Pakistan.
Meanwhile, in 1984, the physical control of Siachen by India created a new edge by shifting the presumed India-Pakistan-China tri-junction from Karakoram Pass to almost 100 km to the west, near Indira Col. The waters from Indira Col drain south to the Siachen Glacier, Nubra, and Shyok Rivers, eventually merging with the Indus.
China’s quest for water originating in the Karakoram–Himalayan region has resulted in China acquiring Aksai Chin in Ladakh by force and Shaksgam Valley in Gilgit–Hunza through an illegal treaty with Pakistan. This farsighted Chinese planning has resulted in a windfall gain for them today.
The only catch in the pack is India’s right to exploit the unexploited 19.48% of river waters of the three rivers flowing through Jammu and Kashmir. India has not exploited any waters of the Indus cascade and has only partially used the Chenab and Jhelum. The Government of India is sitting on a very potent weapon whose deterrent capacity is enormous. It could curtail the enormous consumer surplus being enjoyed by Pakistan for the last 59 years.
The Truth behind Kishenganga River (Neelum River in POK)
Taking advantage of peace on the borders, in 2007 NHPC and HCC started construction of a US $864 Mn Hydroelectric Project on Kishenganga in Gurez Valley, Bandipore District, located in the line of sight of the LOC. Work on the project got halted in 2011 as Pakistan took India to the World Court at Hague, contesting that India’s dam on the river would consume 33% of the water resources, while India’s claim was 10%.
Pakistan, to fight India, started a Hydroelectric Project over the Neelum River in 2008 by giving the contract to China.
Meanwhile, it is now evident that the violent protests in Kashmir in 2008 and 2010 were all linked to Pakistan’s attempt to sabotage and delay the execution of the Kishenganga Project. It again went to the World Court, praying to halt India’s work, but the court ruled in favour of India in 2013 and permitted the project to resume.
Pakistan again engineered protests in Bandipore, alleging that the project violated environmental laws, but this did not last long. China’s continuous intrusions during this period — in Demchok, Koyul, Chushul, and Burthe near Daulat Beg Oldie in Ladakh — were focused on defocusing India from the Kishenganga Project.
Finally, on May 19th, 2018, the Kishenganga Project was formally inaugurated by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, allowing India to assert control over Kashmir’s natural resources.
China’s water vision was revealed when CPEC (China-Pakistan Economic Corridor) expanded in 2017 to include the construction of five dams forming the North Indus River Cascade, which China has promised to finance and build in Pakistan and POK.
The first dam would be built at Bunji near Skardu, with a 22 km long reservoir.
The second dam, the Diamer-Bhasha Dam, would have a live storage of 6.4 million acre-feet of water.
The third, Dasu Dam, would have a 74 km reservoir stretching up to Basha Diamer Dam.
The fourth dam would be at Patan, with a 35 km reservoir leading up to Dasu Dam.
The fifth would be slightly downstream — the 4000 MW Thakot Hydro Project.
Crux of the Story
Money alone will not win wars — harnessing of natural resources shall play a pivotal role in creating a new warfare platform to counter the world.
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